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STOICS ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF CHARACTER
M argaret Graver, Dartmouth

In speaking o f the differentiation o f character I mean to flag a familiar notion that is ba
sic to just about any theory o f character or personality. This is that we come to know essential
characteristics o f persons especially when we recognize and understand the ways in which indi
viduals are disposed to perform certain action-types and/or to experience certain affect-types.
Such dispositions are assumed by common intuition to vary from individual to individual, but to
be more or less stable within individuals, so that they become a useful explanatory device. Con
sider Hera and Athena, in Iliad 4.1 Both have labored for years to bring about the destruction o f
Troy; yet now, when Zeus threatens on a whim to give over the project, it is only Hera who bursts
into a torrent o f angry words. The difference o f response is explained by appeal to a difference o f
character; more specifically, it is explained by appeal to some particular trait o f character. One
does not only want to say that Hera becomes angry on many occasions, but that she is irascible,
that there is some more or less stable thing in her or about her that makes her more prone to angry
responses than is Athena; conversely, one might say that Athena possesses some more or less sta
ble quality o f steadiness or prudence which Hera lacks. In theory, given sufficient means o f ob
servation, one could describe a profile o f the entire assemblage o f traits possessed in any degree
by one individual; in so doing, one would have given an account o f that person’s character or per
sonality.2
Character in this sense bears the entire weight o f moral responsibility in the Stoic compatibilist system: the principal cause why a cylinder rolls when pushed is the roundness o f that
cylinder, and the principal cause for my tendency to moral error is something about me, my own
condition o f vice.3 But Stoics are not usually given credit for any very subtle account o f how
character can vary from one individual to the next. Always primary in Stoic ethics is the distinc
tion between virtuous and non-virtuous characters, and this distinction is not one that admits of
shades o f gray: one is either altogether virtuous or altogether vicious. Not even the specific vir
tues and vices like justice or cowardice can be packaged together in such ways as to give recog
nizable profiles to individuals. For the specific virtues are just different manifestations o f the one
condition which is virtue, and the specific vices are just the absence o f these. As long as Achilles
is not the Stoic sage he is, technically, a coward; Aristides “the Just” is technically unjust.4 There
seems to be little room here for a theory o f personality: the world is populated by only two sorts
o f people, with one sort being extremely scarce and the rest o f us all sharing the same depressing
list o f faults.
I
will show, however, that Stoic writers were perfectly capable o f distinguishing among
character-types also according to secondary differentia that can be exhibited independently o f one
another and in greater or lesser degree. Just as one may observe variations in the sea floor without
disregarding the fact that all o f it is equally underwater, so Stoic theory defines traits o f character
which differentiate one individual from another even where all concerned have the same overall
moral standing. Such secondary characteristics are identified even among the virtuous; more nu
merous, however, and also more philosophically interesting, are the character traits o f the nonvirtuous— that is to say, o f ordinary flawed individuals. For it is these that we have to deal with in
ourselves and others we know.
1 The example is one favored by Chrysippus; see Galen, PHP 3.2-3.
2 A contemporary account o f character which is interestingly similar to the Stoic approach can be found in
Jacobs 2001.
3 The Chrysippan analogy; see Cicero, On Fate 41 ; Aulus Gellius NA 7.2.6-7.
4 Technically so, although Seneca insists on behalf o f the Stoics that not all the vices are equally prominent
in each individual; On Benefits 4.27.
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In looking at these traits o f character I am especially interested in two questions. First,
there is a question about how traits work as causes o f emotion and o f actions generally. Surviving
reports make it clear that at least some traits— those called nosëmata, “sicknesses,” and arrôstëmata, “infirmities”— are defined as erroneous beliefs about the value o f certain objects. It is
not difficult to show that where these traits are concerned, the work o f the trait in determining
action and feeling is a matter o f the logical operation o f the corresponding proposition in the
agent’s practical reasoning. For another group o f traits, called “proclivities,” the evidence is less
clear; I hope to show, however, that an analogous interpretation in terms o f belief is plausible for
these as well. This is not to deny that proclivities such as irascibility may also have a material
basis, say in one’s body type or mix o f constitutive humors; indeed, we should expect that every
trait o f character will be describable in material as well as intentionalist terms. But it is as beliefs,
i.e. as corresponding to particular premises in the practical syllogism, that traits exercise their de
terminative capacity.

Scalar conditions o f mind
I will assume for the moment that a mind is to be thought o f strictly in intentional terms,
as a collection o f beliefs. The ways a mind can be qualified are the ways a belief-set can be quali
fied; that is, by the presence or absence o f particular beliefs or by the relations that obtain among
beliefs in the set. One such qualification is in terms o f coherence: all the propositions believed
might be systematized into a logically coherent set.3*5 Coherence in belief is a centrally important
notion in Stoic moral psychology: it is what guarantees the infallibility and impassivity o f the
wise, and what distinguishes the cognitions, actions, and affects o f the wise as goods where the
corresponding items in ordinary persons count technically as evils. But if what one wants is an
account o f the differences between one wise or foolish person and the next, then coherence is not
a standard one can usefully apply. For coherence is, like pregnancy, not a matter o f degree: one is
either in that state or not; there are no intermediate possibilities. It is, then, a non-scalar condi
tion. Our sources like to remark at this point that every bent stick, no matter how it is bent, is
equally not straight— and, likewise, that everyone who is anywhere below the surface o f the sea is
equally without air; or that a puppy is just as blind the day before it opens its eyes as it was at
birth.6 This is just to say that there are some conditions that cannot be approximated: to fall short
of virtue at all is to fall altogether short o f it.
But to recognize what is absolute and invariable about straightness is not to say that all
straight sticks are identical. The same stick that either does or does not exhibit the entire property
o f straightness may also exhibit varying degrees o f some other property such as length or hard
ness: it may have scalar properties in addition to the one non-scalar property. A helpful passage in
Simplicius gives the Stoic terminology for distinguishing these two kinds o f qualifications.
They [the Stoics] say that hexeis can be tightened and relaxed, but diatheseis cannot. This
is why the straightness o f the stick also is called by them a diathesis, even though it can
easily be changed, since the stick can be bent. For the straightness cannot be relaxed or
tightened, nor can there be more or less o f it, and that is exactly why it is a diathesis. It is
in this way that the virtues are diatheseis, not because o f their stability but because they
cannot be tightened and do not admit o f increase. But the skills ( technai) are not diathe
seis, even though they are not easily altered.7
3 1 am not saying anything here about what standard o f coherence was thought to apply; this issue may or
may not have been worked out in the early Stoa. That coherence in belief was an essential requirement for
knowledge or wisdom is amply attested ; see for instance the definitions o f knowledge recorded by Siöbaeus. Eel. 2.7.51, 73-16-74.3W = SVF3A 12.
6 Cicero, On Ends 3.48; Plutarch, On Common Notions 1063ab.
7 Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories. 237.25-238.20.
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Simplicius is seeking to clarify an important point about the usage o f texts on Stoic ethics, where
virtue and vice, and the specific virtues and vices, are regularly classed as diatheseis. Because a
virtue is typically a stable condition, so that once attained it cannot normally be lost, it is easy for
readers to assume that it is because o f this stability that virtue is called a diatheseis. But this is a
misconception. The characteristic feature o f a diathesis is not stability: there are some stable con
ditions that are not called diatheseis, and some diatheseis that are not stable— for if the vices
could not be lost, then no one could ever become virtuous. Rather, a condition is called a diathe
sis when it cannot be “tightened and relaxed”; that is, when it is non-scalar. Other conditions
which do admit o f increase or decrease are called hexe is.
To avoid confusion, one should note that the word hexis has two different but related uses
in Stoicism: it can refer, as in Simplicius, to conditions which are not diatheseis— that is, to scalar
conditions— but it is also the usual term for the genus to which both hexeis and diatheseis belong.
That is to say, a condition o f any kind can also be called a hexis. The usage follows a typical Stoic
pattern in which a genus— say, the genus o f all A things— is divided into two species, B things
and, again, A things; that is to say, A things which are also B and A things which are not B,
merely-A things.8 So, in the Stobaeus passage treated below, goods and evils o f the mind are di
vided into conditions and movements, but the class o f conditions is further divided into diatheseis
and conditions which are not diatheseis, what might be called “mere conditions.” [See Figure 1].
For clarity in what follows, I will sometimes add the word “mere” or “scalar” to the general term
“conditions,” when it is clear that the writer is making a distinction between diatheseis and the
more specific use o f hexis. Following Simplicius, I refer to diatheseis as “non-scalar conditions.”
The report in Stobaeus explains in more detail how the distinction between scalar and
non-scalar conditions is applied in ethics. In the schematic manner typical o f this text, the Stoic
author sets forth examples o f three classes within the broader class “goods having to do with the
mind,” then o f the same three classes among the corresponding evils.
Some o f the goods having to do with the mind are non-scalar conditions, some are
[mere] conditions, and some are not conditions at all. All the virtues are non-scalar condi
tions, but the specialties (epitëdeumata), like prophecy and so forth, are [mere] condi
tions, while activities in accordance with virtue, like a prudent action, an exercise o f selfcontrol, and so on, are not conditions at all.
Likewise, some o f the bad things having to do with the mind are non-scalar conditions,
some are [mere] conditions, and some are not conditions at all. All the vices are non
scalar conditions, but proclivities, like enviousness, tendency to grief, and so on, are
[mere] conditions, as also are the sicknesses and infirmities. Activities in accordance with
vice, like an imprudent action, an unjust action and so on, are not conditions at all.9
Here are a number o f conditions o f mind which count as scalar conditions: on the good side “spe
cialties,” and on the bad side “proclivities,” “sicknesses,” and “infirmities.” The items on this list,
I contend, are our best candidates in Stoicism for bona fide traits o f character: they are relatively
stable facts about a person that help to explain her feelings and behavior, and they are also vari
able from one individual to the next: they can be present in one person and not present, or only
very little present, in another.10 As they are scalar conditions, they cannot be defined in terms of
coherence or non-coherence in the belief-set; they must consist in some other qualifications o f
8 The usage is explained in Long 1983 .
9 Stobaeus, Eel., 2.7.5f, 70.21-71.14 Wachsmuth (=SVF3. 104).
10 It may be that there are other mere hexeis as well: the lists in Stobaeus typically give only representatives
o f a class. Other possibilities include the lesser of mere faults mentioned in Cicero, Tuse. 4.29-30, and also
perhaps the non-intellectual vices in Stob., Eel. 2.7.5b, 59.2-3 Wachsmuth; the latter are analogous to the
non-intellectual virtues in Eel. 2.7.5b4, 62.17-20 Wachsmuth; Diogenes Laertius 7.90-91 ; Cic. Tuse. 4.30.
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minds. Let us therefore consider each o f these items in turn, beginning with the “specialties” o f
the wise person. For our understanding o f character in the ordinary person will be more secure if
we see that there is significant character variation even among the wise.

Scalar conditions in the wise
The account in Stobaeus gives us a number o f examples o f “specialties,” along with a
kind o f definition.
Fondness for music (philomousia), fondness for literature (philogrammatia), fondness for
horses (philippia), fondness for hunting with dogs (philokumgia), and, in general, the
things that are said to be encyclical skills are called by Stoics “specialties” but are not
said to be forms o f knowledge; ráther, they are classed among the worthwhile hexeis. Ac
cordingly, they say that only the wise person is fond o f music and fond o f literature, and
analogously with the others. And they explain a specialty this way: it is a road that leads
toward what is in accordance with virtue through a skill or through part o f a skill.112

One claim that is made here is that the characteristics o f ordinary persons really do differ sharply
from corresponding characteristics in the wise. Music, literature, driving, and hunting were all
part o f a proper upbringing for a Greek male o f sufficient income; the word “encyclical” implies
that they are just the skills o f the usual liberal education. To say, contrary to intuition, that only
the wise person is fond o f such things is to assert that even very familiar beliefs and attitudes are
transformed when held as pärt o f an overall-coherent epistemic state. O f course no one would
deny that ordinary people can be good with horses or can have read the plays o f Euripides. But
ordinary people might not understand each o f their various pursuits that would they would need
to do in order to live “in accordance with nature.” It must be on grounds that the wise person does
so understand them that the specialties are said to be “among the worthwhile conditions.” If the
condition is really a worthwhile (spoudaios) one as Stoics understand that term, then it can be
predicated only o f those who are also wise.
So much is clear. But the passage also makes another assertion which does nothing to
distinguish normative from ordinary humanity, but is suited rather to differentiate among the wise
themselves. This is that the specialties are not themselves forms o f knowledge, as are the virtues,
but belong rather with the skills; each is “a road . . . through a skill or through part o f a skill.” A
“skill” in Stoicism is like a form o f knowledge in that it is a system o f stable cognitions (katalëpseis).L But “skill” is a broader term: there are systems o f cognitions which count both as forms o f
knowledge and skills, but there are also some such systems which count as skills but not as forms
o f knowledge. No doubt this is because knowledge, as a condition, is a characteristic the wise
person’s overall epistemic makeup, something indispensable about the way that person forms and
retains correct judgments; for instance, the sage always makes correct apportionments among his
various responsibilities. Hence all forms o f knowledge are non-scalar and interentailing. But a
mere skill may be predicated in greater or lesser degree, and it may be predicated o f one wise per
son without necessarily being predicated o f them all.
It may be helpful to think o f a skill as one possible subset o f a wise person’s entire beliefset, the subset being delimited by reference to some one object-type. It is just because the subset
is delimited in this way— essentially, in terms o f its content— that the skill in question does not
have to be attributed to every imaginable wise person. For Kerferd has argued convincingly that
while the manner o f the wise person’s knowing is always the same, the content o f that knowledge
11 Stobaeus, Eel., 2.7.5b 11, 67.5-12 Wachsmuth (= S F F 3.294); similarly 2.7.5k, 73.13-15W.
l2Sextus AM 7.227, 11.182; it is, further, a system o f cognitions “trained together toward some good end”
(SVF 2.93-95). The cardinal virtues are both skills and forms o f knowledge; Stob. Eel. 2.7.5b, 58.9-10W.
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is left open. As long as all the beliefs held by any one o f the wise are true, properly justified, and
mutually reinforcing, there is no good reason to insist that all wise persons must know everything
and therefore exactly the same things.13 It is entirely open, then, to say that each o f them may dif
fer from all others in the specific skills that he or she possesses. And this is just what we should
expect to find if the beliefs o f the wise are all acquired in the same way as everyone else’s,
through individual experience.
What then is a specialty? It is obvious that having a specialty means being habitually en
gaged with some one kind o f object— horses, music, literature, or the like— and making that habit
one’s own way o f acting in accordance with nature. For a specialty is “a road that leads toward
what is in accordance with nature.” The specialty itself, then, must be that mental characteristic
which makes a person especially inclined to engage in some one class o f activity. We might un
derstand it to be a positive attitude toward some object-type which is aimed at by a skill. Such an
attitude could well take the form o f a belief: a person who is fond o f music, for instance, might
believe, truly and with justification, that it is appropriate for her to spend many hours a day prac
ticing, studying, or listening to music. This sort o f fondnes^tehöt in itself a virtue, and it is not
by any means necessary for virtue that a person have it, or any specialty at all.14 One wise person
may be fond o f music but not o f dogs, while another, equally wise, devotes herself to horses, or to
a variety o f pursuits. Such preferences are personality traits o f the wise, products o f their varied
experience; they are not what it is to be wise.
We saw earlier that the wise person may have a rich and varied affective experience, with
many powerful feelings directed at genuine goods and evils and, also, some quasi-emotional feel
ings similar to those o f the ordinary person. The specialties, however, are not part o f that affective
experience. For the specialties, as such, are concerned with the kinds o f objects which the wise
person recognizes as inconsequential to his or her happiness. One can be fond o f music and still
understand that playing music is not in itself a good thing, and that being thwarted in a wish to
practice is not an evil. The wise person has this right. For the ordinary person, matters are very
different.

Scalar conditions in the non-wise: sicknesses and infirmities
Stobaeus lists three classes o f non-scalar conditions in ordinary persons: proclivities (eukataphoriai), sicknesses (nosëmata) and infirmities ( arrôstëmata). Among these, the condition
about which we have the fullest information is the one called a “sickness” o f mind, a nosos or
nosëma (plural nosëmata). Stobaeus reports a definition, a list o f examples, an account o f the op
posite condition, called a proskopë or aversion, and a distinction between “sicknesses” and the
very similar “infirmities.”15 All o f that same material also appears in an earlier report by Cicero
and is attributed by him to Chrysippus.16 The latter source is somewhat awkward to use, in that
Cicero, who thinks the Greek account is overdeveloped, chooses to condense it by conflating the
terms he uses to translate nosëma and arrôstëma. He does eventually disambiguate the terms,
however, and it becomes clear that the account given in his source was substantially the same as
that we have in Stobaeus.
In both sources, a “sickness” is defined as a single belief o f a particular kind. In Stobaeus,
it is “a desirous opinion which has hardened into a condition and become deep-rooted, according
to which people suppose that things which are not choiceworthy are extremely choiceworthy.”
Similarly, Cicero says that what he is at this point calling an infirmity is “a vigorous opining that

13 Kerferd 1978.
14 Stob., Eel. 2.7.6d, 77.7 W.
15 Stobaeus, Eel. 2 .7 .10e, 93.8-14 Wachsmuth, (= 5 VF 3.421, part); compare Chrysippus apud Galen, PI IP 4.5.21 22; Seneca, Ep. 75.10-12; Diogenes Laertius 7.115; Athenaeus 11.464d.
16 Tuse. Disp. 4.23-26. [refer to my Appendix C to support the attribution]
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some object is worthy o f pursuit which is in fact not worthy o f pursuit, that opinion being deeply
attached and rooted in the mind.” Thus the sickness called “fondness for pleasure” (philëdonia)
must be a deeply-rooted belief that pleasure is worthy o f pursuit; i.e., that pleasure is a good for
oneself or that it is good for oneself to have it. Exactly analogous are the proskopai or aversions,
mentioned in both sources as deeply-rooted beliefs that certain objects are worthy o f avoidance.
An example o f an aversion is misogyny, the deeply-rooted belief that women are to be avoided or
that being around women is an evil for oneself.
An important part o f these definitions is what they say about the objects at which sick
nesses and aversions are directed. The insistence that these conditions take as their objects things
which are in fact not worthy o f pursuit or avoidance suggests the class o f objects (or, properly
speaking, states o f affairs) which Stoics call indifferents; that is to say, anything not counted as an
instance o f virtue or vice. And the examples we are given bear this out. Stobaeus’s examples in
clude fondness for women, fondness for wine, fondness for money; and there are many similar
items in Cicero and other sources: gluttony, love o f good repute, fondness for birds, and so on.
(See Table 1.) But it is not only the nature o f its object that distinguishes the sickness from other
beliefs. Sicknesses also view their objects in a characteristic way, as being “extremely worthy o f
pursuit” when in fact they are not. The definition stipulates both that the judgment in question
must set a certain value on its object and that that evaluation must be in error. It is the erroneous
evaluation that distinguishes the sicknesses from the specialties o f the wise, which are likewise
directed at indifférents and in fact resemble the sicknesses in their nomenclature: compare philomousia, philogrammatia, philokunëgia with philarguria, philodoxia, philogunia. Moreover, the
sickness is a mistaken evaluation which “has hardened into a condition and become deep-rooted.”
“Hardened into a condition” indicates that the sickness is a persistent state rather than a single
event; “deep-rooted” suggests, further, that the erroneous belief is unusually difficult to eliminate,
one which cannot be corrected without some wrenching readjustment o f the personality.
The difference between the sicknesses and the related conditions called “infirmities” (arrôstëmata) does not appear to be very significant. Stobaeus indicates that the infirmities are a
subclass within the sicknesses: they are “sicknesses that occur together with weakness.”17 This
definition, which also appears in Cicero and in Diogenes Laertius, matches well with the attested
term: rhômë or “strength” is sometimes mentioned as a quality o f mind, and arrôstëma adds a
privative prefix to this; hence an infirmity is literally a “lack o f strength.”18 It is not clear, though,
how the mention o f “weakness” does anything to modify the definition o f sickness already given.
“Weakness” is mentioned often enough in Stoic texts, usually as a characteristic o f assent in the
non-wise: to assent “weakly” or “out o f weakness” is to endorse a proposition that a person with a
“strong” or fully coherent belief-set would not endorse.19 It follows, for Stoics, that a// the mis
taken views we hold are held “weakly”— and thus that the sicknesses already satisfy the defini
tion for infirmities. At most, the difference between them, will be a matter o f emphasis, as that an
infirmity is a sickness in someone who is somehow especially tolerant o f self-contradiction. But
in fact no author makes much o f the difference; some use one term, some the other, and the same
points are made about each.
Nosëmata and emotion
As concerns this group o f conditions we can also trace out just how it is that a trait o f
character plays itself out in our behavior and, especially, in our emotional experience. For beliefs
o f the sort identified here figure prominently in Stoic accounts o f how emotions are generated.
17 Stobaeus, Eel. 2 .7 .10e, 93.14 Wachsmuth, (= SVF 3Λ 2 1, part).
18 Rhômë in Stob. 2.7.5b (58.15 Wachsmuth) is one o f the “virtues which are not types o f knowledge,” for
which see also Cicero, Tuse. Disp. 4.31.
19 Stob., Eel. 2.7.1 lm; 111.18-12.8 W; Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1057b, etc. The best discus
sion is Gorier 1977.
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Indeed, if I understand correctly the explanation o f this point that was promulgated especially by
Chrysippus, mistaken beliefs about the value o f indifférents are one o f two principal causes for
the emotions that we have.20 The emotion itself is relatively short-lived; it is classed as an im
pulse and is thus a point-in-time mental event.21 The mistaken evaluation, though, persists over
time and may be involved in the causation o f many single episodes o f emotion. To define an
emotion as a type o f impulse is to say, for one thing, that to have an emotion is also to do some
thing, to bring about some change in the world. The kind o f change involved in emotion is (or
begins as) a change inside the agent: the action o f grieving, for instance, is primarily a matter o f
contracting one’s soul-material, while that o f desiring is primarily a matter o f extending one’s
soul-material toward some object. It is thus that Chrysippus and Zeno before him explain the way
emotions feel to us. But to say that an emotion is an impulse is also to say that it is, like every
human impulse in Stoicism, an act o f judgment—that is, an intellectual assent to a proposition
with a certain content. For impulse in general, that content takes the form, “It is appropriate for
me (kathëkei moi) to do X right now (autothen).”22 Therefore an emotion, too, must assent to
some proposition like “it is appropriate for me right now, my circumstances being what they are,
to have this feeling.” And in fact it is that content, or some more particularized version o f it, that
is definitive for emotion; the feeling itself merely supervenes on the judgment.
Let us look more closely, then, at that propositional content. This is spelled out for us
more fully in the definitions that are standardly given for the four major emotion-types or genera.
We are told, for instance, that emotions in the genus distress are caused by “a fresh believing that
an evil is present toward which it is appropriate to be contracted.” Similarly, desires are caused by
“believing that a good is in prospect.. .that belief itself including a motive element as to that be
ing a thing really to reach for”; instances o f fear believe “that an evil is in prospect... a thing
really to avoid”; instances o f delight believes “that a good is present, toward which it is appropri
ate to uplift [one’s spirits].”23 Now in each o f these cases, the specified content includes three
components: (1) an evaluation o f some object as bad or good, (2) a belief concerning the appro
priateness o f some affective response, and (3) a belief that said object is either present or in pros
pect. These components can easily be arranged into a kind o f practical syllogism which yields the
relevant impulsory impression as its conclusion. Take for example the delight o f someone who
has finally won the Massachusetts lottery:
(1) Having a lot o f money is a good thing.
(2) When a good thing is present to me, it is appropriate for me to be delighted.
(3) I have just now acquired a great deal o f money.
Conclusion: it is appropriate for me to be delighted right now.
Here (1) and (2) are beliefs one already has at the time one comes to believe (3). Believing (1 )
and/or (2) does not in itself constitute an emotion; it is rather a cognitive condition that is more or
less stable over a period o f time. But neither would an acceptance o f (3) result in emotion if (1)
20 Reasons for attributing the analysis as stated here to Chrysippus are two: Cicero’s principal account in
Tuse. Disp. 3 was heavily influenced by Chrysippus, and this account lays considerable stress on this struc
ture (3.24-27, 52-75, note esp. 61 fin.), and the Chrysippan therapy for grief reported by Cicero in Tuse.
Disp. 76-77 differs from the Cleanthean specifically in its emphasis on the importance o f the appropriate
ness premise (premise 2 on p. 00).
21 Stobaeus, Eel. 2.7.10 (88.8-12 Wachsmuth): “They [the Stoics] say that a pathos is ‘an excessive impulse
disobedient to choice-making reason’ or ‘an irrational movement o f the mind contrary to nature’ and that
every pathos belongs to the mind’s directive faculty.”
22 Stob., Eel. 2.7.9, 86.17-18 Wachsmuth.
23 Stobaeus, Eel. 2.7.10b, 90.14-16 Wachsmuth (= SVF3 394 part)
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and (2) were not already in place. So the evaluative belief, (1), is necessary for the emotion to
occur, though not sufficient for it; it is a cause, though not the sole cause, o f that event. And that
same evaluative belief may also function as a cause o f other emotions concerned with money. If
instead o f gaining money the person is only considering the prospect o f gaining money, the emo
tion generated might be desire; if he considers the prospect o f losing money, it might be fear, and
so forth. Different versions o f premise (2) will come into play in each case, but proposition (I)
will be the same for that entire range o f emotions.
We see, then, how a person who has one o f the traits called “sicknesses” will be espe
cially disposed to experience a range o f emotions in connection with one particular object. That it
is good to have lots o f money is something that most o f us probably do believe to some extent,
just as we believe in the intrinsic value o f many other external objects. Accordingly, any o f us is
likely to have some feelings about winning the lottery or losing our shirts on the stock market.
But the person who has the nosema o f money-fondness will exhibit a much clearer and more
definite pattern o f emotions. Because his belief is that money is extremely choiceworthy, he is
likely to have stronger feelings about it than the average person, or to be emotional about much
smaller sums. No doubt he will also give such priority to the possession o f money that his emo
tions about that object will take precedence over other emotions he might have had: he will be
much more anxious about his veterinarian’s bill than he is about his dog. O f course, he himself
may not analyze the matter as we have done. He may well experience the emotions as involuntary
forces arising from some mysterious region o f the self. But a reflective observer will still say with
confidence that it is his special evaluative belief that is at fault.
Because the “sicknesses” are so deeply implicated in the aetiology o f emotion, and be
cause emotions are themselves acts o f judgment, there is some potential for confusion between
the evaluative beliefs which are causes o f emotion and the point-in-time judgments which actu
ally constitute emotions. A much-cited passage in Diogenes Laertius speaks o f three, o f the condi
tions Cicero and Stobaeus call nosêmata as if they were themselves examples o f emotions; more
over. it attributes that identification to Chrysippus himself.
They [the Stoics] think that the pathë are judgments, as Chrysippus says in his work On
Emotions. For [he says that] fondness for money (philarguria) is a supposition that
money is a fine thing, and similarly with drunkenness, stubbornness,24 and so forth.
(7.111)
An interpreter who studied only this passage might well conclude that a pathos for Chiysippus is
simply a judgment o f value. As it stands, this cannot be right. Chiysippus does, certainly, believe
that the pathë are judgments, but he holds also that they are impulses, mental events which essen
tially involve some temporary change in the mind-material.25 Judgments with only the content
specified here would not satisfy the Stoic requirements for impulses: they might be necessary for
the emotion to occur, but they could not be sufficient for it. Nor is it even plausible to say that
what happens when I become angry over the veterinarian’s bill is just that I decide, then and
there, that money is a fine thing to have. That I must have believed all along; it is the interaction
o f that pre-existing belief with other beliefs, including the new information about my veterinar
ian, that generates the emotion.
Why, then, does Diogenes Laertius believe that greed and stubbornness are among Chrysippus’s examples o f pathë ? The answer could be that Chrysippus did sometimes use the word
pathos to refer to those and similar long-term conditions. We have a clear example o f this usage
in a passage from Book 4 o f the Peri Pathön, quoted by Galen; it is a misleading usage, but not

24 For stubbornness (akolasia), compare L. pervicacia, labeled a nosema by Cicero at Tuse. Disp. 4.26.
25 Seeesp. Galen, PHP Α2Λ-5 = SKF3.463.
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altogether unmotivated.26 Chrysippus is comparing the practice o f philosophy to that o f medicine:
just as the doctor must have intimate knowledge o f the illnesses (pathë) o f the body, so also the
“doctor o f the mind” must have intimate knowledge o f a variety o f conditions o f the mind.
For we do also say in reference to the mind that some people are strong or weak or have
good tension or lack tension, and also that they are sick or healthy, and it is also in the
same way that we speak o f illness (pathos) and infirmity and things like that in the mind.
There is some word-play: the usual sense o f pathos, which predominates in other fragments o f
this work, can hardly have been forgotten. Chrysippus perhaps feels that an overlap between pa
thos in the sense o f “emotion” and pathos in the sense o f “medical symptom” gives more point to
his metaphor o f philosophy as a healing art for the mind. In this somewhat rhetorical passage, he
is not concerned about maintaining the distinction between condition and movements.
Very probably it is this ambiguity in Chrysippus’s usage which is to blame for an appar
ent error in Cicero’s account o f the Stoic theory. Cicero has taken quite a bit o f heat for remark
ing, at Tuse. Disp. 3.7 and occasionally thereafter, that an appropriate Latin translation for what
Stoics mean by pathos could be morbus. Morbus would o f course be fine for nosema (and is his
standard rendering for that term in Tuse. Disp. 4.23-26), but it certainly doesn't mean “emotion”
as pathos does. Cicero may have been misled by Chrysippus’s play on words, or he may be trying
rather clumsily to reproduce it. Errors along the same line can be traced also in some o f the later
Greek handbooks.27

Proclivities: A cognitivist account
Returning now to Stobaeus’s list o f scalar conditions o f mind (p. 00), we find one group
o f conditions we have not yet considered. These are the proclivities, o f which that passage lists as
examples “enviousness” (phthoneria) and “tendency toward grief’ (epilupia). Another portion of
Stobaeus explains that a proclivity is a tendency toward some specific emotion; alternatively, it is
a tendency toward some action contrary to nature.
A proclivity is a proneness to emotion, as to one o f the actions contrary to nature. Exam
ples include a tendency to grief, irascibility, enviousness, a tendency to wrath, and things
like that. There are also proclivities toward other actions contrary to nature, such as to
ward theft and adultery and violence, in accordance with which persons are called
thieves, adulterers, or violent characters.28
Irascibility, for instance, is the condition o f those who are easily angered: they are not angry all
the time, but they become angiy more often than other people. Similarly, a person might be timid,
that is, have a proclivity to fear, even when he is not actually afraid, and so on with grief, anxiety,
envy, and the other examples on Table 2.29

26 Galen, PHP 5.2.22-24,26-27 = SVF 3.471.
27 Thus Stob. 2.7.10bc (91.3-4, 19-20 Wachsmuth) lists philëdonia, philoploutia, and philodoxia as exam
ples o f desire; and ps.-Andronicus 4 similarly lists no fewer than eight items which seem really to be no.se

ntata: philëdonia, philochrëmatia, philotimia, philozöia, philosömatia, gastrimargia, oinophlugia, lagneia.
28 Ecl. 2.7.1 Oe, 93 W. The Stoic author now gives euemptösia as the main term for proclivity using eukataphoria (“proneness”) in explanation. The two terms are obvious synonyms.
29 Incidentally, there can also be proclivities to good things, what Cicero calls facúltales (4.28). Presumably
this means that while all virtuous people are courageous, some are especially likely to do brave actions, or
that while all virtuous people are susceptible to that class o f feelings called the eupatheiai, one individual
wise person could in theory be especially prone to a particular feeling such as joy or reverence.
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The proclivities bear an obvious resemblance to the sicknesses, since both types o f condi
tion predispose an individual to experience some emotions rather than others. However, the pat
tern o f predisposition is different for the proclivities. A person with a “sickness” is especially
concerned about some one object-type, and experiences a range o f emotions concerned with that
object. Someone with a proclivity, by contrast, experiences some one emotion-type more than all
others, and must therefore experience it in connection with a wide range o f objects. Hence while
the names o f specific sicknesses are usually derived from those objects—philodoxia from reputa
tion (doxa), gunaikomania from women (gunaikes), and so on— the names o f the proclivities in
dicate only the nature o f the response: epilupia is a proneness to grief (Jupe), orgilotës a prone
ness to anger (orge), and so on. The one cares deeply about, say, birds, and may become mad or
sad or glad about them; the other has no special attachment to birds or anything else, but merely
becomes mad about everything.
Cicero compares the proclivities to the condition o f people who have trouble with their
sinuses or with intestinal cramping: the stuffy nose or abdominal pain is present only some o f the
time, but the condition o f being prone to those ailments is with those unfortunate people all o f the
time (Tuse. Disp. 4.27-28). The comparison undoubtedly reproduces a similar comparison made
by Chrysippus. We know from Galen that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus for comparing the
minds o f non-wise persons during and prior to emotions to “bodies which have a tendency to in
cur fevers or diarrhea or things like that upon a slight and chance pretext.” 30 It is an easy guess
that the comparison made by Chrysippus (which is not otherwise extant) was just the same as
Cicero is making; that is, that he compared mental proclivities like irascibility to bodily proclivi
ties like asthma. Indeed, if we make that assumption it becomes easier to understand and resolve
Posidonius’s objection. Posidonius assumes that what is being compared to the body without any
particular tendency to illness is the mind which never experiences any emotion at all— that is, the
mind o f the sage. This, he says, is not an accurate comparison, since the minds o f sages are actu
ally proof against emotion, while every body, even a healthy one, retains some susceptibility to
disease. But Posidonius may misunderstand the analogy. His objection is not well taken if Chrysippus’s intent is, like Cicero’s, to explain that some (but not all) non-wise persons have particu
lar tendencies to experience certain emotions upon small provocation. In that case, the minds
which are analogous to healthy bodies may be those o f other non-wise persons, those who are not
especially given to any one emotion. The analogy then holds well enough, since such persons will
still be susceptible— one might even say, prone— to emotions generally. But Chrysippus may not
have made this part o f the comparison explicit.31
0 Galen, PHP 5 2.2-7, fr. 163 Edelstein and Kidd, lines 1-30: “They [Chrysippus and Posidonius] do not
give the same explanation concerning what kind o f mind inferior persons have during emotions and prior to
emotions. For Chrysippus says that it is analogous to bodies which have a tendency to incur fevers or diar
rhea or things like that upon a slight and chance pretext. Posidonius criticizes this comparison: he says that
the mind o f the inferior person should not be compared to such bodies but simply to healthy bodies. For
whether they become feverish for large or small causes does not make any difference as concerns their ex
periencing this, that is, having the pathos, at all, rather, they differ only in that some are more prone and
others less. For this reason he says that Chrysippus is improperly comparing the health o f the mind to that
o f the body, and the sickness [of the mind] to the condition which falls easily into sickness. For there is a
mind which is free o f pathë—that o f the sage, obviously— but no body is free o f pathë. It would have been
more just to compare the minds o f inferior persons ‘either to bodily health, which includes a proneness to
sickness (for that is the term Posidonius uses) ‘or to sickness itself,’ since it is a condition which can only
be either disease-ridden or actually diseased. In fact, this is what he says: ‘For this reason, also, sickness o f
mind does not, as Chrysippus thinks, resemble a disease-ridden condition o f body through which it is sub
ject to incur irregular non-periodic fevers; rather, mental ‘sickness’ resembles either bodily health, which
includes a proclivity to sickness, or the sickness itself. For bodily illness is a condition already diseased, but
the sickness Chrysippus is talking about is more like a proclivity to fevers.’”
’’ Chrysippus’s fondness for analogies involving health and disease is a frequent source o f confusion. In the
present analogy, the “sickness” (nosos) is an observable symptom such as fever and is thus analogous to an
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We have seen that the sicknesses are cognitive conditions consisting entirely in a particu
lar sort o f belief. If we assume that the proclivities, too, consist in belief, then we may be inclined
to understand these conditions in such a way that they function very similarly to the sicknesses in
generating emotions. For mistaken attributions o f value are only one o f two kinds o f prior beliefs
which count as principal causes o f emotions. In addition to regarding some external object as
good (or bad), one must also believe that some certain response is the appropriate response for
oneself to have in the presence or prospect o f such an object. That is, one must hold a belief simi
lar in structure to the one labeled (2) in the pathetic syllogism on page 11 : that “when a good is
present, it is appropriate for me to be delighted.” Suppose for a moment that just as a sickness is
an exceptionally strong commitment to some version o f premise (1) in that syllogism, so also a
proclivity is an exceptionally strong commitment to some version o f (2). A person with this
commitment would not be very concerned about any one object-type; rather, he would believe
that some one response— say, fear— is extremely or very often appropriate as a way o f dealing
with the world. He might believe, for instance, that fear is the appropriate response to an unusu
ally wide range o f situation-types. While any non-wise person might think fear is an appropriate
response some o f the time, this person thinks it is the right reaction to the rumble o f a subway
train or the growl o f a Pekinese. As a result, he will indeed be afraid o f those things, whenever the
relevant circumstances arise, whether or not he recognizes that his cognitive makeup is such as
we have described. And this is just what it is to be timid.
This is an attractively neat account o f the proclivities. It gives the Stoics a strongly cognitivist understanding o f all four o f Stobaeus’s differentiable conditions— for the infirmities are not
significantly different from the sicknesses, and the specialties o f the wise, while they are not spe
cifically said to be beliefs, are very closely linked to the skills, which are systems o f cognitions.
Our evidence is thin: no proper definition for the proclivities is extant, and so the interpretation
given here cannot be regarded as secure; still, in the absence o f clear evidence to the contrary, it is
the style o f explanation we should prefer. And the interpretation in terms o f appropriatenessbeliefs has a further advantage in that it can be extended to cover tendencies toward other sorts of
actions contrary to nature, as mentioned in the Stobaeus passage quoted on page 14. A proclivity
to adultery, for instance, can be explained by the operation in one’s everyday practical reasoning
o f a premise that “sleeping with other people’s spouses is an extremely appropriate thing for me
to do,” and so also with tendencies toward other action-types such as theft or violence.
But we hear very little about this second type o f proclivity. Perhaps it was felt that ten
dencies o f this kind had already been adequately explained in the account o f personality traits
disposing to emotion— that a habitual adulterer must just be someone with philogunia, and the
person tending to violence can also be described as irascible. For it is a remarkable fact about the
Stoic approach to ordinary personalities that it is almost exclusively interested in those traits
which determine our emotional experience. Character is thought o f as essentially a set o f emotive
dispositions; observable behavior is considered solely as manifesting the emotional impulse. Our
emotional lives are central to who we are: to a large extent, we are even identified with them.

This emphasis is merely a concession to human life as we know it. It is still true,
for Stoics, that the emotions as we know them are founded in error, that they are perver
sions o f the sorts o f affective responses humans should have and were designed to have.
The w ise have personalities: they have their varieties o f experience, their personal
knowledge bases, their favorite pursuits. As we know, the wise also have their own varie
ties o f affect; indeed, a close study o f the texts suggests that their lives are surprisingly
rich in affective dimensions. But their personalities are not structured around affect,
actual episode o f emotion; it thus cannot be the same as the nosos or nosema discussed above. Misunder
standing this, a reader might easily assume that a euemptösia is actually a tendency to acquire a nosëma or
arrôstëma in the technical sense. It may be for this reason that Cicero indicates, in Tuse. Disp. 4.28, that a
proclivity is properly understood as “a proclivity to become infirm (aegrotare·)."
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whereas those o f the non-wise apparently are. Reasons for this are to be sought in the de
velopmental account o f character, in the many-layered process o f maturation and corrup
tion that produces an ordinary adult human. An understanding o f Stoic thought on charac
ter is not really complete without a consideration o f that developmental account, and for
that reason I do treat that subject at length in another part o f my larger project. For the
moment, though, I am content to conclude that Stoicism did have considerable resources
for describing the personality traits o f individual humans; it was not limited to describing
a person merely as wise or foolish.
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TABLE 1: REPRESENTATIVE SICKNESSES AND AVERSIONS
C ondition

A ttested

fo n d n e ss fo r g lo ry
fo n d n e ss fo r m o n e y

p hilodoxiaf doxomania, gloriae cupiditasL
philarguria,bd avaritiac
philogunia,b gunaikomania,ef m ulierositasc
opsomania,e ligurritioc
philoinia,be vinulentiac
philêdonia ad
ornithomania,f ortugom aniae
misogunia,h mulierum odiumL
misanthrôpia,h generis humani odiumc
m isoiniab

lik in g for w o m e n
c ra zin ess for fo o d
fo n d n e ss for w in e
fo n d n e ss for p leasu re
c ra zin ess for birds
hatred o f w o m e n
hatred o f h u m an ity
hatred o f w in e

term ( s )

Sources:
a. Diogenes Laertius 7.115 (and cf .philarguria and methë in 7.111); b. Stobaeus, Eel. 2.7.10e
(93.1-14 W); c. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.25-26; d. Plutarch, On Stoic selfcontradictions 1050d, e. Athenaeus, Deipnosophistai 11.464d (SVF 3.667), f. Chrysippus in
Galen, PHP 4.5.21-22 (SPF 3.480)
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TABLE 2: R E P R E S E N T A T IV E P R O C L IV IT IE S
C ondition

A ttested

enviousness
irascibility
cow ardice
tendency to pity
tendency to g rief
tendency to wrath
anxiety
desirousness

phthoneria,ab invidus essec
orgilotês, h iracundia1
deilia, d timidus essec
eleêm osunêf misericors essec
epilupiah
akrocholia
anxietasc
libidinosus essec

term ( s )

Sources:
a. Diogenes Laertius 7.115; b. Stobaeus, Eel. 2.7.10e (93.1-14 W); c. Cicero, Tusculan Disputa
tions 4.25: d. Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1050d
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